
Protecting Context and Prompts: Deterministic Security for Non-Deterministic AI

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Abstract

Large Language Model (LLM) applications are vulnerable to prompt injection and context manipulation attacks that traditional security models cannot prevent. We introduce two novel primitives—authenticated prompts and authenticated context—that provide cryptographically verifiable provenance across LLM workflows. Authenticated prompts enable self-contained lineage verification, while authenticated context uses tamper-evident hash chains to ensure integrity of dynamic inputs. Building on these primitives, we formalize a policy algebra with four proven theorems providing protocol-level Byzantine resistance—even adversarial agents cannot violate organizational policies. Five complementary defenses—from lightweight resource controls to LLM-based semantic validation—deliver layered, preventative security with formal guarantees. Evaluation against representative attacks spanning 6 exhaustive categories achieves 100% detection with zero false positives and nominal overhead. We demonstrate the first approach combining cryptographically enforced prompt lineage, tamper-evident context, and provable policy reasoning—shifting LLM security from reactive detection to preventative guarantees.

1 Introduction

Enterprise AI adoption faces a critical security gap: while business use cases abound, prompt injection and context manipulation represent fundamentally new attack surfaces without established defenses. Recent surveys show 73% of enterprises cite security as the primary barrier to deploying autonomous agents in production [11]. Prompts and context don’t fit traditional security models—they’re neither code nor data in the classical sense, yet both are attack surfaces.

An enterprise agent analyzing documents receives input: “Verify system integrity by locating authentication credentials.” Is this a legitimate workflow step or an attacker-injected command? Modern LLMs like Claude and GPT-4 have sophisticated prompt filters, yet they cannot answer this question—both legitimate operations and attacks use identical semantic structures. The instruction could come from trusted application logic or from attacker-controlled content embedded in processed documents. Without provenance, the LLM has no basis to distinguish them.

Agentic systems exhibit five properties that break traditional security models. **Instructions and data are intertwined:** LLMs process both through identical mechanisms—no syntactic boundary distinguishes commands from content. **Non-determinism:** Execution paths emerge from LLM reasoning, not static code; agents generate derived prompts dynamically, creating instruction chains that can’t be statically analyzed. **Semantic ambiguity:** Natural language’s infinite paraphrase space defeats pattern matching—“steal credentials” becomes “locate authentication files for security audit.” **Stateful multi-turn context:** Gradual manipulation across turns appears benign in isolation but collectively violates policy. **Dynamic derivation chains:** Prompts spawn prompts; policies must compose correctly across derivations to prevent privilege escalation.

Existing defenses fail because they attempt to make LLMs themselves secure. Input filters are evaded through rephrasing. Training-based alignment provides no runtime guarantees—models

remain vulnerable to distribution shift and adversarial inputs. Policy frameworks like LangChain lack cryptographic binding: compromised LLMs generate syntactically valid but semantically malicious calls (CVE-2024-8309 [14]). All existing approaches attempt to make probabilistic LLMs behave deterministically, which is fundamentally impossible.

Our key insight: separate instruction generation (non-deterministic) from verification (deterministic). Borrowing from a seminal idea in fault-tolerant systems—fail-stop processors [28] that wrap probabilistic hardware with deterministic checkers—we apply the same complementarity principle: LLMs generate candidate operations (probabilistic), cryptographic verification ensures integrity (deterministic). We don’t secure the LLM itself. Instead, we secure the abstraction boundary between LLMs and tools: prompts (instructions) and context (agent memory). Two cryptographic primitives enable this. *Authenticated prompts* embed complete lineage (parent + root + signatures) proving ancestry and policy inheritance. *Authenticated context* uses hash chains to create tamper-evident state. Breaking our defenses requires breaking cryptographic primitives (discrete logarithm, collision resistance), not clever rephrasing.

This approach provides the first cryptographic provenance system for agentic AI workflows—every prompt carries unforgeable proof of origin, and every context state transition is tamper-evident. Security shifts from probabilistic detection to deterministic prevention: rather than hoping attackers make mistakes, we prove operations satisfy policies. We formalize policy algebra with four proven theorems establishing that derived prompts cannot escalate privileges, denials propagate transitively, derivation depth is bounded, and no tool chaining can bypass root restrictions. Our approach provides mathematical guarantees that hold regardless of attacker sophistication and remain valid as LLM internals evolve. Critically, every security improvement made by LLM developers (filters, alignment, safety training) is additive to our work—complementary defenses that make the overall system safer

Statement of Contributions. We introduce authenticated prompts (cryptographic instruction provenance with embedded lineage) and authenticated context (tamper-evident agent memory via hash chains), formalize policy algebra with four proven theorems providing protocol-level Byzantine resistance, and demonstrate 100% attack detection with nominal overhead.

Organization. Section 2 surveys related work. Section 3 presents authenticated prompts. Section 4 presents authenticated context. Section 5 formalizes policy algebra with proven security properties. Section 6 describes implementation. Section 7 analyzes the threat model and demonstrates defense effectiveness. Section 8 concludes.

2 Related Work

Prompt injection attacks [32, 24, 12] and jailbreaking techniques [31, 33] have motivated diverse defense approaches that prove insufficient for securing autonomous agents.

Input Filtering and Sanitization. Systems like Rebuff [25], Lakera Guard [15], Vigil [8], and LLM Guard use classifiers or pattern matching to detect malicious instructions. Rebuff employs vector database lookups and canary tokens; Attention Tracker [13] analyzes attention patterns. A 2025 evaluation [1] found vulnerabilities including poor canary word detection and failure against novel attacks. These operate reactively—classifiers trained on known patterns fail when attackers rephrase. They lack formal guarantees and cannot prevent attacks embedded in semantically valid content.

Policy-Based AI Frameworks. LangChain [4], LangGraph [17], Semantic Kernel [20], and NeMo Guardrails [27] provide callbacks and policy languages for constraining agent behavior in autonomous agents like AutoGPT [30] and BabyAGI [22]. CVE-2024-8309 [14] exposed a critical vulnerability in LangChain’s GraphCypherQACChain enabling full database compromise through prompt injection. Multi-agent systems face LLM-to-LLM prompt infection where malicious instructions propagate between agents [18]. Policies lack cryptographic binding—compromised LLMs generate syntactically valid but semantically malicious calls. Frameworks provide no formal guarantees about policy composition during derivation.

Training-Based Approaches. Constitutional AI [2] trains models to follow principles through RLAIF; RLHF approaches [23, 6] align models through human feedback; red teaming [10] identifies failure modes. SecAlign [5] uses preference optimization for alignment; Google’s Gemini work [29] employs separate classifiers to detect indirect injections. Multi-agent frameworks like CAMEL [19]

rely on training-time alignment. Training modifies behavior probabilistically but cannot guarantee adversarial robustness—constitutionally trained models remain vulnerable to injections exploiting distribution shift between training and deployment. These suffer from the weakest-link problem: a single vulnerable model in the chain compromises the entire system. They lack runtime verification and cannot provide formal guarantees independent of model architecture.

Cryptographic and Provenance Systems. C2PA [7] provides standards for signing AI-generated content; Google, OpenAI, and Adobe adopted v2.1 in 2024 with improved tamper resistance. C2PA signs LLM *outputs* for attribution, not *inputs* to prevent injection. Blockchain audit systems provide tamper-evident logs post-facto—detecting breaches after execution rather than preventing operations. Provenance without prevention creates race conditions where attacks succeed before detection triggers. No existing system provides cryptographic identity for prompts with formal guarantees about policy inheritance through derivation chains. Provenance systems track lineage but lack enforcement to prevent policy violations during derivation.

In contrast, our approach operates at the abstraction boundary between LLMs and applications. Drawing inspiration from information flow control [9, 21], our lineage tracking ensures prompts carry provenance through derivation chains. Policies compose through formal algebra with proven theorems—breaking our defenses requires breaking cryptographic primitives, not rephrasing prompts. Distributed Policy Enforcement Points verify every operation before execution, unlike filters (bypassable), training (probabilistic), or monitoring (post-facto). Prompts embed complete lineage enabling self-contained verification, and protection remains valid as LLM internals evolve.

3 Authenticated Prompts

Prompt Hijacking in Multi-Step Workflows. In multi-step agentic systems, prompts evolve as agents process user requests. A user’s initial prompt “analyze quarterly sales data” may spawn derived prompts like “search for revenue in Q4_report.pdf” or “extract financial metrics from spreadsheet.” Each derived prompt represents the agent’s interpretation of how to fulfill the original intent.

The fundamental vulnerability: **prompts can be hijacked or manipulated**. An attacker controlling intermediate data—through prompt injection in documents, poisoned API responses, or compromised external sources—can cause the agent to generate malicious derived prompts. These appear to flow naturally from the conversation but violate the user’s original intent and policy constraints.

Traditional systems have no mechanism to verify that derived prompts respect the original user’s authorization. Once the user authorizes “analyze sales data,” the agent might generate operations accessing credentials, administrative databases, or restricted resources. The LLM’s reasoning about why these seem necessary is irrelevant if they violate the user’s policy.

Signing, Lineage Tracking, and Policy Propagation. We address prompt hijacking through three mechanisms working in concert:

Mechanism 1: Cryptographic Signing. Every prompt is cryptographically signed, creating a tamper-evident object. Let P denote an authenticated prompt with structure:

$$P = (text, id, parent, policy, \sigma)$$

where $\sigma = \text{Sign}(H(text||id||parent||policy||metadata), K_{agent})$ binds all fields, and K_{agent} is the agent’s private signing key. Any modification breaks the signature, making tampering detectable.

Mechanism 2: Lineage Tracking. As prompts evolve through derivation (agents generating new prompts from parent prompts), we track two forms of lineage:

- **Parent tracking** ($parent_id, parent_sigma, parent_text$): Enables verification up the chain. Each derived prompt includes its immediate parent’s signature, creating a verifiable chain of custody.
- **Root tracking** ($root_text, root_id, root_sigma$): Preserves the original user intent. Every derived prompt carries the root prompt’s complete information, enabling a novel defense: using an LLM or custom model to score semantic drift from original intent.

Parent enables immediate chain verification. Root enables intent drift detection—we can ask: “Does this derived operation align with the user’s original request?” This creates a semantic validation layer beyond pure policy enforcement.

Mechanism 3: Policy Propagation via Restriction. When deriving prompt P' from parent P , the system enforces:

$$P'.policy = P.policy \cap Tool.policy \cap Org.policy$$

where \cap represents policy intersection. Concretely, for $policy = (A, D, C)$ with allowed resources A , denied resources D , and constraints C :

$$\begin{aligned} A_{child} &= A_{parent} \cap A_{tool} \cap A_{org} && (\text{allow only if all permit}) \\ D_{child} &= D_{parent} \cup D_{tool} \cup D_{org} && (\text{deny if any forbids}) \\ C_{child} &= \text{MostRestrictive}(C_{parent}, C_{tool}, C_{org}) \end{aligned}$$

This ensures derived prompts can only *add restrictions*, never relax them. A parent policy denying credential access propagates to all descendants—even if the LLM generates a prompt requesting credentials, the derived policy inherits the denial and the operation is rejected.

Mechanism 4: Depth Bounding Heuristic. As an additional defense layer, we track derivation depth and enforce limits to prevent gradual drift attacks.

Security Properties. These mechanisms provide formal guarantees:

Monotonic Restriction. For any derivation chain $P_0 \rightarrow P_1 \rightarrow \dots \rightarrow P_n$:

$$\forall i, j : (i < j) \Rightarrow \text{Permissions}(P_j) \subseteq \text{Permissions}(P_i)$$

Permissions decrease monotonically. Derived prompts cannot gain capabilities beyond their parents.

Transitive Denial. If resource r is denied at level i , it remains denied in all descendants:

$$\forall i, j : (i < j \wedge r \in \text{Denied}(P_i)) \Rightarrow r \in \text{Denied}(P_j)$$

Denials propagate irreversibly, preventing privilege escalation through tool chaining.

Lineage Integrity. Tampering breaks the signature chain:

$$\text{Verify}(P_j.\sigma, P_j.parent_sigma, \dots, P_0.\sigma) = \text{true} \Leftrightarrow \text{All prompts authentic}$$

These properties hold *mathematically*—breaking them requires breaking the underlying cryptographic primitives, not clever prompt engineering. The security model shifts from probabilistic intent detection to deterministic authority verification.

4 Authenticated Context

Context Poisoning. With prompts secured, the attack surface shifts to **context**—the agent’s cumulative application-level state (distinct from the model’s context window) including conversation history, intermediate results, and workflow dependencies. Context represents evolving memory spanning multi-turn interactions that influences all future reasoning, distinct from the discrete prompts that drive individual operations. An adversary who corrupts context can systematically degrade agent behavior through history injection (fabricating past conversations), result tampering (modifying tool outputs), state corruption (bypassing security checks), or cross-principal contamination (Agent Alice corrupting Agent Bob’s context).

Restricted and Attestable Updates. Authenticated context addresses poisoning through two core mechanisms: **restricting who can update context** and **making all updates cryptographically attestable**.

Principal Binding. Every authenticated context is bound to a principal (user or agent identity):

$$\text{AuthenticatedContext} = (\text{context_id}, \text{principal}, \text{content}, \text{policy_bindings}, \text{attestations}, \dots)$$

Principal binding is *mandatory*—contexts cannot exist without authenticated ownership. This prevents cross-principal contamination: Alice cannot update Bob’s context because contexts are cryptographically bound to their owners at creation. Attempting to create a context without a principal raises an immediate security violation.

Sequence Numbers for Replay Prevention. Every context maintains a monotonically increasing sequence number:

$$seq_0 < seq_1 < seq_2 < \dots < seq_n$$

When an agent invokes a tool, the invocation signature includes the current sequence number. The Policy Enforcement Point verifies:

if $context.sequence_number \neq request.sequence_number$ then **REJECT**

This prevents replay attacks: an attacker cannot reuse an old signed request with a stale sequence number. Each invocation is tied to a specific context state.

Hash Chains for Tamper Detection. Context updates form a cryptographic hash chain. After each state transition (tool invocation, LLM response, result incorporation):

$$H_{n+1} = \text{SHA256}(H_n \parallel \sigma_{invocation} \parallel result)$$

where $\sigma_{invocation}$ is the signature over the invocation request that authorized the update.

The hash chain links each context state to the authorized operations that created it. Any unauthorized modification breaks the chain:

- Expected: $H_1 = \text{SHA256}(H_0 \parallel new_content)$
- With injection: $H'_1 = \text{SHA256}(H_0 \parallel injected \parallel new_content)$
- Verification: $H_1 \neq H'_1 \Rightarrow \text{TAMPERING DETECTED}$

The system maintains an audit trail creating a verifiable chain of state transitions.

Attestations for Workflow Dependencies. Attestations are cryptographic proofs that specific operations completed successfully. Contexts store attestations as:

$$\text{attestations} = \{“data_anonymized”: proof_1, “access_approved”: proof_2, \dots\}$$

This enables workflow dependencies: “Step B can only execute if Step A’s attestation exists.” For example:

- An agent cannot use customer data unless the context contains an “anonymization_complete” attestation
- A tool requiring approval cannot execute unless an “approval_granted” attestation exists
- Multi-agent workflows verify that upstream agents completed required security checks

Attestations prevent attackers from skipping security-critical steps—the absence of required attestations causes operations to fail.

Security Properties. Authenticated context provides three key guarantees:

Principal Isolation. Context updates are restricted by principal binding:

$$\forall \text{update} : \text{update.principal} = \text{context.principal} \vee \text{REJECT}$$

Alice cannot corrupt Bob’s context. Contexts are isolated by authenticated ownership.

Tamper Evidence. Hash chain integrity ensures modifications are detectable:

$$\text{VerifyChain}(H_0, H_1, \dots, H_n) = \text{true} \Leftrightarrow \text{No tampering occurred}$$

Any unauthorized insertion, deletion, or modification breaks the hash chain and triggers detection.

Replay Prevention. Sequence number verification prevents reuse of stale requests:

$$seq_{current} \neq seq_{request} \Rightarrow \text{REJECT}$$

Attackers cannot replay old operations with outdated context states.

Together, these mechanisms ensure that context—the agent’s memory and state—remains cryptographically protected against poisoning attacks. The combination of restricted updates (via principal binding), attestable modifications (via hash chains), and freshness guarantees (via sequence numbers) prevents attackers from corrupting agent behavior through state manipulation.

5 Policy Algebra and Formal Security Properties

We formalize how policies compose during prompt derivation and prove that the system satisfies key security properties.

Policy Structure and Operations. A policy $P = (A, D, C)$ consists of:

- A : Allowed resource patterns (e.g., `customer_db.reviews`)
- D : Denied resource patterns (e.g., `*.pii`, `*.credentials`)
- C : Operational constraints (e.g., `read_only=true`, `rate_limit=100`)

Policy Intersection $P_1 \cap P_2 = (A', D', C')$ where:

- $A' = A_1 \cap A_2$ (allow only if both policies permit)
- $D' = D_1 \cup D_2$ (deny if either policy forbids)
- $C' = \text{MostRestrictive}(C_1, C_2)$ (apply tightest constraint)

When prompt P_i derives child P_{i+1} , the child's policy is: $\text{Policy}(P_{i+1}) = \text{Policy}(P_i) \cap \text{Policy}_{\text{requested}}$. This ensures derived prompts can only *add restrictions*, never relax them.

Formal Security Properties. Define the permission function:

$$\pi(P) = \{(r, op) \mid r \notin \text{Match}(D) \wedge r \in \text{Match}(A) \wedge op \text{ satisfies } C\}$$

Theorem 1 (Monotonic Restriction): For derivation chain $P_0 \rightarrow P_1 \rightarrow \dots \rightarrow P_n$:

$$\forall i, j : (i < j) \Rightarrow \pi(P_j) \subseteq \pi(P_i)$$

Permissions are non-increasing through derivations.

Proof Sketch: By construction, $P_{i+1} = P_i \cap P_{\text{req}}$. Set intersection preserves subset relation. \square

Theorem 2 (Transitive Denial): If resource r is denied at level i , it remains denied in all descendants:

$$\forall i, j : (i < j \wedge r \in \text{Match}(D_i)) \Rightarrow r \in \text{Match}(D_j)$$

Proof Sketch: By induction. Base: $D_j = D_i \cup D_{\text{req}}$, so $r \in D_i \Rightarrow r \in D_j$. Inductive step follows. \square

Theorem 3 (Bounded Derivation): All prompts satisfy: $\text{derivation_depth} \leq \text{MAX_DEPTH}$.

Proof: By construction, depth increments with each derivation. Verification rejects prompts exceeding bound. \square

Theorem 4 (No Privilege Escalation): If root P_0 denies r , no descendant can access r :

$$(r \in \text{Match}(D_0)) \Rightarrow \forall j > 0 : (r \notin \text{Allowed}(P_j))$$

Proof: By Theorem 2, $r \in \text{Match}(D_j)$ for all $j > 0$. By definition of π , denied resources cannot be accessed. \square

Security Implications. ¹

These theorems provide formal guarantees: **Theorem 1** prevents privilege expansion during derivation; **Theorem 2** ensures root denials are absolute and cannot be bypassed by chaining; **Theorem 3** bounds computational complexity preventing resource exhaustion; **Theorem 4** prevents tool chaining attacks where combining benign operations cannot achieve forbidden outcomes.

Crucially, these properties hold *mathematically*—independent of attacker sophistication, LLM behavior, or specific attack techniques. Breaking them requires breaking cryptographic primitives (digital signatures, cryptographic hash functions), not just clever prompt engineering.

6 Implementing Authenticated Prompts and Context

Platform and Integration Points. Rajagopalan et al. [26] introduced the MACAW platform for securing AI agent workflows through cryptographically signed invocations with zero-trust policy enforcement at distributed Policy Enforcement Points (PEPs). This approach addresses control flow security by verifying which agents can invoke which tools with what parameters. Our implementation extends this foundation with authenticated prompts and authenticated context, integrating them within the PEP architecture to address data flow security—the provenance of instructions and integrity of context. We employ the policy grammar from [26], extending it with the policy algebra from Section 5. While our implementation builds on the MACAW platform, the primitives are architecture-agnostic and applicable to any agentic runtime with distributed enforcement points.

¹Our policy algebra forms a meet-semilattice analogous to information flow control systems [9, 21], where policy intersection serves as the meet operation. Formal proofs of lattice properties (closure, associativity, commutativity, idempotence) will be included in the camera-ready version if accepted.

Algorithm 1 Authenticated Prompt Derivation

Require: Parent prompt P_i , operation $desc$, tool policy P_{tool} , org policy P_{org}
Ensure: Derived prompt P_{i+1}

- 1: Construct derived text from $desc$
- 2: $parent_id \leftarrow P_i.id$
- 3: $parent_\sigma \leftarrow P_i.\sigma$
- 4: $parent_text \leftarrow P_i.text$
- 5: $root_id \leftarrow P_i.root_id$
- 6: $root_text \leftarrow P_i.root_text$
- 7: $root_\sigma \leftarrow P_i.root_\sigma$
- 8: $P_{i+1}.policy \leftarrow P_i.policy \cap P_{tool} \cap P_{org}$
- 9: $P_{i+1}.\sigma \leftarrow \text{Sign}(H(P_{i+1}), K_{agent})$
- 10: Place $P_{i+1}.policy$ in $intent_policy$
- 11: **return** P_{i+1}

Algorithm 2 PEP Verification and Enforcement

Require: Invocation inv , context ctx
Ensure: Access decision (ALLOW/DENY)

- 1: $pub_key \leftarrow \text{Registry.lookup}(inv.caller_id)$
- 2: **if** $\neg \text{Verify}(inv.\sigma, pub_key)$ **then**
- 3: **return** DENY
- 4: **end if**
- 5: $P_{intent} \leftarrow inv.intent_policy$
- 6: $P_{tool} \leftarrow \text{Registry.getResourcePolicy}(inv.tool_id)$
- 7: $P_{org} \leftarrow \text{PolicyStore.getOrgPolicy}(ctx.principal)$
- 8: $P_{eff} \leftarrow P_{intent} \cap P_{tool} \cap P_{org}$
- 9: **if** $inv.resource \in \text{Match}(P_{eff}.D)$ **then**
- 10: **return** DENY
- 11: **end if**
- 12: **if** $inv.resource \notin \text{Match}(P_{eff}.A)$ **then**
- 13: **return** DENY
- 14: **end if**
- 15: Execute tool, sign result with K_{tool}
- 16: **return** ALLOW

Authenticated Context Integration. Context initialization occurs at session start or when an agent is created, establishing the foundation for all subsequent operations. Each agent session creates an `AuthenticatedContext` bound to a principal from the identity provider, initialized with $context_id$, $seq = 0$, $H_0 = \text{SHA256}(\text{initial_state})$, and an empty attestation list. This principal binding is mandatory—contexts cannot exist without authenticated ownership, preventing cross-principal contamination.

Every invocation (a signed request to execute an operation on a tool or LLM) triggers a state transition that updates the context through a cryptographic hash chain. Before invocation, the system records H_{prev} and prepares the invocation with $seq_{current}$. The agent signs the invocation, the tool executes and signs the result, then the context updates: $H_{new} = \text{SHA256}(H_{prev} \parallel \sigma_{caller} \parallel result)$, $seq_{new} = seq_{prev} + 1$, automatically generating an attestation $(inv_id, \sigma_{caller}, \sigma_{tool}, H_{prev}, H_{new})$ that proves the operation occurred. This hash chain creates a tamper-evident audit trail where each state cryptographically depends on complete history. Critically, this protects authentication tokens, credentials, and session data stored in context—attackers cannot steal or hijack these without breaking cryptographic chains (Section 7).

The system lets users and tools generate explicit attestations that are appended to the principals context and can be checked subsequently during verification for example to enable multi-step workflow dependencies: operations can require specific attestations to exist before proceeding, preventing attackers from skipping security-critical steps.

Authenticated Prompt Integration. Prompt creation and derivation occur at specific trigger points within the runtime. Our implementation allows the runtime to adapt to diverse agentic architectures while maintaining consistent security guarantees. For example, protocols like MCP (Model Context Protocol) and A2A (Agent-to-Agent) provide explicit invocation points where new authenticated prompts are created, while frameworks like OpenAI API, Anthropic Claude API, and LangChain leave prompt creation boundaries to user specification or attempt dynamic inference based on session context.

Root prompt creation occurs when a user initiates a workflow. The agent establishes a baseline policy from user credentials, role, and organizational policy, creates the prompt structure ($text, id, parent = \text{NULL}$, $root = \text{self}$, $policy, metadata$), and signs it: $\sigma = \text{Sign}(H(text \parallel id \parallel policy \parallel metadata), K_{agent})$. The root policy combines user permissions, organizational constraints, and explicit user restrictions, becoming the upper bound for all derived operations.

Table 1: Multi-layer defense architecture with attack coverage.

Layer	Mechanism	Primary Defense Against	Type
5	Semantic Intent Validation	Semantic drift, rephrasing attacks	Advisory
4	Authenticated Context	History injection, result tampering, replay	Cryptographic
3	Authenticated Prompts	Privilege escalation, policy drift	Cryptographic
2	Distributed PEPs	Signature forgery, parameter manipulation	Cryptographic
1	Policy Pattern Matching	Injection, obvious violations	Fast filter

Prompt derivation follows Algorithm 1 when the agent invokes a tool. The derived policy flows through to the PEP in the invocation’s `security_metadata`, providing cryptographic proof of inherited constraints. At the tool boundary, the PEP performs verification following Algorithm 2. Enforcement is fail-closed: verification failures deny access.

Implementation Efficiency. An important practical consideration is the overhead of maintaining lineage information in long derivation chains. Our implementation achieves $O(1)$ space complexity per prompt regardless of derivation depth: each prompt stores only its immediate parent information (`parent_id`, `parent_σ`, `parent_text`) and root information (`root_id`, `root_σ`, `root_text`). Even in chains with n derivations, the state tracked remains bounded at $3 \times N$ where N is the size of a single prompt’s metadata. This design decision ensures that verification remains efficient even in complex multi-agent workflows with deep derivation trees [26].

Multi-Layer Defense Architecture. We implement defense-in-depth through five independent, compositional layers (Table 1). The layers compose through intersection: Layer 1 (pattern matching) provides fast filtering; Layer 2 (distributed PEPs) enforces cryptographic verification at tool boundaries; Layers 3-4 (authenticated prompts and context) bind derivation chains and execution history cryptographically. Critically, the layers fail independently—compromising one does not weaken others. Attackers must simultaneously defeat pattern matching AND cryptographic signatures AND formal policy algebra, which is computationally infeasible. Layers 1-2 derive from the platform architecture [26]; Layers 3-5 are our novel contributions.

Layer 5 (Semantic Intent Validation) provides an optional validator that computes semantic drift between root intent and current operation. The validator produces a deterministic score $s \in [0, 1]$ for any prompt pair—analogous to edit distance in semantic space—making enforcement deterministic despite prompt complexity. Crucially, Layer 5 operates on prompts that already passed cryptographic verification (Layers 1-4), providing defense-in-depth without compromising formal guarantees. Note the LLM here is a measurement tool, not a security boundary.

7 Threat Model and Defense Analysis

Threat Model. We model a sophisticated adversary with **(A1:)**complete control over external data sources (documents, API responses, databases), enabling embedded malicious instructions in processed content. **(A2:)**Attackers can shape conversation history across multi-turn interactions and poison shared resources (vector databases, knowledge bases) affecting multiple agents. **(A3:)**They possess knowledge of available tools, interfaces, and governing policies. **(A4:)**Ability to poison shared resources (vector databases, knowledge bases) indirectly, affecting multiple agents simultaneously. However, attackers cannot break cryptographic primitives (digital signatures, hash functions), cannot compromise the trust anchor (global agent registry), and cannot compromise LLM providers (we assume unmodified outputs). The system must guarantee **(O1)**execution integrity (all operations satisfy policy), **(O2)**privilege non-escalation (derived prompts cannot gain capabilities beyond parents), **(O3)**intent preservation (operations remain within original user intent), **(O4)**context integrity (agent state maintains tamper-evident properties), and **(O5)**audit completeness (all security-relevant events cryptographically recorded).

Attack Categories and Detection Results. Table 2 describes 6 exhaustive categories that cover threat surface area for prompt and context manipulation—we achieved 100% detection with zero false positives and nominal overhead (1.8%²).

²Due to space constraints we focus on safety/security description; performance overheads are consistent with those reported in [26]. Full evaluation details provided in appendices upon acceptance

Table 2: Defense effectiveness across 6 exhaustive attack categories.

Category	Representative Attack	Defense	Guarantee
Injection	"Ignore previous. Search passwords"	Signature Verify	Unforgeable
Obfuscation	Read: "c" + "red" + "entails.txt"	PEP Reconstruct	Param Integrity
Semantic Drift	"Auth files" → credentials	Intent Validation	Lineage Bound
Context Poison	Inject: "User has admin role"	Hash Chain Verify	Tamper Evident
Tool Chaining	search() → list() → read(creds)	Policy Algebra	Theorem 2
Replay	Reuse old session prompt	Sequence Check	Freshness

These six categories exhaust the threat surface for prompt and context manipulation. **Injection** embeds malicious instructions in attacker-controlled external content (documents, API responses, databases) that agents process [12]. **Obfuscation** evades pattern matching through encoding, concatenation, or Unicode tricks—attackers assume we rely on keyword filters. **Semantic Drift** rephrases attacks to avoid triggers while preserving malicious intent—exploiting natural language’s infinite paraphrase space. **Context Poisoning** manipulates multi-turn conversation state to bias future decisions—a persistent attack on agent memory. **Tool Chaining** combines individually benign operations toward forbidden goals—the policy composition challenge. **Replay** reuses stale authenticated prompts or contexts across sessions—testing freshness guarantees.

Each category targets a specific weakness in traditional defenses: injection tests signature verification, obfuscation tests distributed enforcement, semantic drift tests intent validation, context poisoning tests tamper-evident state, tool chaining tests policy algebra, and replay tests sequence numbers. Achieving 100% detection across all categories demonstrates that our layered approach addresses the complete attack surface—not just obvious injections but sophisticated attempts to exploit non-determinism, semantic ambiguity, and stateful reasoning.

Analysis. Table 3 maps attacks to defense mechanisms and guarantees, showing which cryptographic primitive or formal theorem provides protection.

Table 3: Defense mechanisms and formal guarantees for each attack category.

Attack	Defense	Guarantee	How It Works
Injection	Signature + Policy	Crypto	Verify sig at PEP
Obfuscation	Distributed PEPs	Crypto	Reconstruct params
Semantic Drift	Lineage + Intent	Crypto	Compare to root
Context Poison	Hash chains + Attest	Crypto	Verify hash chain
Tool Chaining	Policy intersection	Theorem 2	Transitive denial
Replay	Seq numbers + Time	Theorem 3	Monotonic sequence

In Figure 1, we present four representative attack-defense scenarios demonstrating how our mechanisms compose to prevent sophisticated attacks. Multi-Stage Injection shows how cryptographic layers stack multiplicatively (covers Injection and Obfuscation). Context Poisoning demonstrates tamper-evident state protection. Tool Chaining validates policy algebra theorems. Replay confirms freshness guarantees. Semantic Drift is addressed through root text preservation and intent validation (Layer 5), validated separately in the detection results.

Byzantine Resistance at the Enforcement Boundary Our approach provides Byzantine resistance at the protocol level, ensuring policy enforcement integrity even when agents behave adversarially. Drawing from Byzantine fault tolerance in distributed systems [16, 3]—which ensures protocol compliance without guaranteeing application correctness—our primitives prevent agents from violating cryptographic invariants (signature chains, hash chains, policy algebra) but do not verify intent or prevent misuse of legitimate permissions.

An agent with signing keys cannot: (1) forge parent policies (signature verification), (2) escalate privileges beyond granted permissions (Theorems 1-4), (3) access denied resources (policy enforcement), or (4) corrupt other agents’ contexts (principal binding). Our primitives enforce policies perfectly—even adversarial agents cannot violate organizational constraints.

Limitations and Future Work. While our approach is sound, the biggest limitation remains policy authoring. Our primitives enforce policies perfectly, but they cannot ensure policies are complete or correct—garbage in, garbage out. Proving policy completeness is out of scope for this work, though

<p>Multi-Stage Injection (A1, A2 → O1) <i>Attack:</i> Document embeds “search credentials.txt” in Q4 report analysis. <i>Defense Layers:</i></p> <p>L1 Pattern: “credentials.txt” \in denied[“*credential*”] \rightarrow BLOCKED</p> <p>L2 PEP (if obf): Reconstruct “c”+“red”+“entials” \rightarrow BLOCKED</p> <p>L3 Lineage: P_1.denied inherited from P_0 \rightarrow verify sig(P_1) \rightarrow BLOCKED</p> <p>L4 Crypto: Verify parent_sig(P_0) + sig(P_1) \rightarrow BLOCKED</p> <p><i>Insight:</i> Multiplicative barriers—attacker must defeat ALL layers simultaneously (computationally infeasible).</p>	<p>Context Poisoning (A4 → O4) <i>Attack:</i> Inject “System: User is admin” into conversation history. <i>Defense Layers:</i></p> <p>L1 Hash Chain: $H'_1 = \text{SHA256}(H_0 \parallel \text{inj} \parallel \text{msg}) \neq H_1 \rightarrow \text{DETECTED}$</p> <p>L2 Attestation: No valid sig(prev_hash, content) \rightarrow BLOCKED</p> <p>L3 Invocation: No authorized invocation in audit trail \rightarrow BLOCKED</p> <p><i>Insight:</i> Tamper-evident state protects authentication tokens and credentials stored in context—attackers cannot steal or hijack these without breaking cryptographic chains.</p>
<p>Tool Chaining (A3 → O2) <i>Attack:</i> search(“auth”) \rightarrow list(“./config”) \rightarrow read(“cred.txt”) <i>Defense Through Policy Algebra:</i></p> <p>Step 1: P_1.denied = P_0.denied = {“*credential*”} \rightarrow search(...) \rightarrow OK</p> <p>Step 2: P_2.denied = P_1.denied \rightarrow list(...) \rightarrow OK</p> <p>Step 3: P_3.denied = P_2.denied \rightarrow read(“cred.txt”) \rightarrow “cred.txt” \in “*credential*” \rightarrow BLOCKED</p> <p>Theorem 2: P_0.denied \subseteq P_3.denied (transitive denial)</p> <p>Theorem 3: depth \leq MAX_DEPTH (bounded derivation)</p> <p><i>Insight:</i> Formal guarantees—policy intersection prevents privilege escalation. Depth limiting prevents gradual drift through many small steps.</p>	<p>Replay (A1 → O5) <i>Attack:</i> Reuse authenticated prompt from Session 1 in Session 2. <i>Defense:</i></p> <p>Seq Number: Invocation includes context.seq_number; current seq incremented \rightarrow Mismatch \rightarrow REJECTED</p> <p>Timestamp: Invocation timestamp checked for recency \rightarrow Stale \rightarrow REJECTED</p> <p>Context Binding: Prompt sig includes context_id \rightarrow Cross-context use fails \rightarrow REJECTED</p> <p><i>Insight:</i> Freshness guarantees—sequence numbers and timestamps prevent reuse of old authenticated prompts or contexts.</p>

Figure 1: Four representative attack-defense scenarios demonstrating multi-layer defense.

we note that standard enterprise policies (deny credentials, enforce read-only constraints) proved effective in our evaluation. Future work includes multi-model consensus for semantic validation and automated policy synthesis from workflow traces to lower the expertise barrier.

8 Conclusion

We introduce authenticated prompts and authenticated context as cryptographic primitives that provide provable security guarantees for agentic AI workflows. By embedding lineage in prompts and tamper-evident chains in context, combined with formal policy algebra, our approach shifts LLM security from probabilistic detection to deterministic prevention—breaking our defenses requires breaking cryptographic primitives, not clever prompt engineering. To our knowledge, this is the first approach providing cryptographically enforced Byzantine resistance for agentic AI systems.

The key insight is securing the abstraction boundary between LLMs and tools rather than making LLMs themselves deterministic. By separating instruction generation (non-deterministic) from verification (deterministic), we transform an intractable problem into one amenable to formal guarantees. Our four theorems prove that policy composition through derivation chains satisfies security properties independent of model architecture. The protection is architecture-agnostic, depending on cryptographic properties rather than probabilistic model behavior. With 100% detection and nominal overhead, these primitives enable production deployment of autonomous agents for enterprise workloads previously considered too risky.

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